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We study Japanese investments between 1980 and 1992 to assess the effectiveness of state
promotion efforts in light of strong agglomeration economies in Japanese investment. Two policy
variables are consistently shown to influence the location of investment -foreigntrade zones and
labor subsidies. We use simulations to explore the impact these policies had on the geographic
distribution of Japanese investment. The simulations reveal that in aggregate promotion programs
largely offset each other; however, unilateral withdrawal of promotion causes individual states
to lose substantial amounts of foreign investment.
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State governments compete aggressively for new manufacturing plants by offering a variety of
incentives. Investors are not unaware of these efforts, and press accounts suggest that investment
incentives have come to be taken for granted.' While state officials often claim that tax and
subsidy incentive packages are justified by future increases in employment and business taxes,
some of these gains come at the expense of other states that would have received the iiivestrnent
if the incentives were not provided. Thus, it is possible that national welfare would be larger in
the absence of interstate competition for investment.
The presence of agglomeration economies, local externalities that encourage related firms
to locate in proximity to each other, provides a rationale for states to increase their subsidy
efforts. If agglomeration economies are significant determinants of investment location, state
policies that succeed in drawing investment will tend to realize additional long-run benefits
associated with increased agglomeration. However, since agglomeration economies magnify
initial differences between states, their presence implies that states with weak industrial bases
may find it impossible to attract investment unless they provide very large subsidies. Hence,
agglomeration effects may also provide a. caveat that it may be in the best interest of many
states to refrain from subsidy competition.
This paper explores the extent to which state governments' promotional programs influenced
the location of Japanese manufacturing investment in the United States. Unlike previous papers
examining investment location choice in the presence of tax and fiscal variables, our study
estimates the impact of tax and fiscal variables while controlling for state (unmeasurable) fixed
effects and industry specific agglomeration effects. We employ simulations to assess the impact
'The Financia.! Times (October 1991) reported that expectedgubsidies tonew uivestors almost doubled in the
decade duetothe intensification of competition among 3tftte.
1of policies on the distribution of Japanese investment. The results indicate that the provision
of foreign trade zones and labor subsidies attracted Japanese investment. Policies designed to
attract investment were often thwarted by emulation; however, we show that individual states
would have lost significant investment had they not offered incentives when other states were
offering them.
There are a large number of empirical studies exploring the influence of state fiscal variables
on the location choice of investment using discrete choice models with either states or counties
as the set of choices. Friedman et al (1992) provides a survey of research on foreign direct
investment while Papke (1991), Bartik (1985), and Canton (1983) are examples of research on
U.S. domestic investment. This paper emphasizes the interaction between state policies and
industry-level agglomeration externalities. We quantify the impact of incentives while control-
ling for the prior location pattern of U.S. and Japan-based establishments which Head, Ries,
Swenson (1994) found to have a significant influence on location choices of Japanese investors in
the United States. Another of this paper's contributions is our use of state-specific constants to
control for unavailable or non-quantifiable state characteristics. This procedure avoids omitted
variable biases that could arise from correlation between policy variables and fixed state effects
that are not captured by other explanatory variables. Indeed, the inclusion of fixed effects in-
creases the statistical significance of some variables while eliminating the significance of others
that were previously thought to be important determinants of investment location.
Using estimated parameters, we conduct simulations to explore the effect of investment
promotion policies on the geographic distribution of Japanese investment in the presence of ag-
glomeration economies. Policy may have little impact if location choice is primarily determined
by factor conditions and the industrial base. However, if policy attracts investment, agglom-
eration economies will tend to induce further investment in the future. This will magnify any
2local welfare benefits associated with the receipt of foreign direct investment. The simulations
should provide a more complete quantification of the economic significance of policy variables
than has been previously available.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the evidence on the effects of invest-
ment promotion incentives on location decisions. We then specify the estimation method and
regression equation in Section III. The data are discussed in section W and estimation results
analyzed in section V. Simulation results of promotion policy experiments follow in section VI.
We offer some tentative policy implications in the concluding section.
II Theory and Evidence on Promotional Programs
The fiscal literature considering the use of tax and promotion instruments has yet to examine the
efficacy of these instruments in the presence of agglomeration. In a related concern, Rauch (1993)
has analyzed the role of industrial park developers in organizing agglomerated industries. In
order to facilitate location shifts, the developer induces a handful of investors to begin operations
in the industrial park. First movers receive subsidized land prices relative to later movers. This
differential land pricing allows the developer to capture some of the profits associated with the
agglomeration economies2
The model of the industrial park is instructive in thinking about state subsidies; it shows
that agglomeration externalities could motivate states to attempt to alter their configuration
of industries. On the other hand, there are some strong contrasts between state development
and Rauch's model of industrial parks. In Rauch's model the developer is a monopolist parsing
out space over time in the industrial park. But states compete against each other and this may
2Followers are willing to pay a higher land price, since they are paying for the value of locating in proximity
to the now clustering first movers as well as paying for the use of the land.
3ultimately undercut the ability of any one state to reconfigure the system of industries within its
borders. Our empirical tests will examine whether state inducements produced any measurable
changes in investment location decisions.
Previous empirical work on the influence of state fiscal variables is mixed. Bartik (1985) and
Coughlin, Terza and Arromdee (1991) have included taxes and concluded that they deterred
investment. In contrast, Carlton (1983) and Wheeler and Mody (1992) find little evidence that
tax variables exert any measurable effect on investment. In part, it is likely that these findings
are mixed since it is difficult for broad fiscal indicators to adequately represent the broader
spectrum of taxes and incentives offered to individual investors.3
Other authors have looked at state investment promotion efforts. Both Luger and Shetty
(1085) and Woodward (1992) include an "effort index" to represent a state's intensity in seeking
investments. The "effort index" provides a count of the number of state programs offered to
potential investors, in studying Japanese investment Woodward concludes that state investment
promotion offices in Japan provide a positive impetus, while there is no apparent boost created
by effort as measured by the count index. The failure of this index does not necessarily imply that
state promotion efforts are ineffectual. The "effort index" does not control for the magnitude
of those efforts. If the number of offerings is positively correlated with the magnitude of those
offerings, then the index woujd accurately capture state promotion efforts. On the other hand, all
states might be spending comparable amounts of investment promotion monies, with some states
focusing their efforts on a limited number of large programs while other states distributed their
monies more thinly across a wider range of policies. We make use of more precise measurements
3An exception is Papke (1987, 1991) who studies industry-specific tax cffecti that result from the integrated
effects of state and federal taxes. These more precise measures fuggest that higher state taxes dlirninih new
investment. Papke also includes measures of state expenditures on fire and police protection, This is important,
since higher taxes will not necessarily deter investment if those taxes finance services that prospective investors
value.
4of state polices which are directly linked to the foreign investor's after-tax profit function.
III The Location Choice Model
We begin with the decision facing a Japanese manufacturer who wishes to locate a facility in
the United States. We assume that investor i selects the state that yields the highest expected
value of after-tax profits. The firm considers the intrinsic characteristics of the stat and any
agglomeration benefits or subsidies available in state j.
Whileone can not directly observe investor valuations, one can, however, observe state char-
acteristics at the time that investors select a site from the set of potential locations. Conditional
logit estimation infers the value of state characteristics by estimating the extent to which they
result in one state being chosen over the others. The conditional logit model stipulates that
the attractiveness of state jtoinvestor i can be decomposed into the sum of a measured term,
denoted M, and unmeasured term, U. If U, is distributed according to the cumulative density
exp(— exp(—U13)] then profit maximization implies that the probability any particular state is
chosen out of a choice set denoted .7 will be an increasing S-shaped function of the measured
attributes of that state as perceived by the investor.4
?robability(i chooses j) = (1)
EJE.7expM11)
The remaining task is to paraineterize the observable component of profitability, M1, as a
function of available data.
Let profits in any state depend on the final goods price, F, and the prices of four inputs—
4Thisresult,proved by McFadden (1974), seems to rely on a rather arbitrary assumption regarding the error
term. However, itissimply a generalization of the standard logit model1 since differences in profitability for two
observablyequalstates depend on differences in U, which will, under the error term assumption made above, be
distributed according tothelogisticfunction, areasonably close approximation of the normal distribution.
5labor, capital. foreig-n and locally procured intermediateinputs—whichwe denote w, r, vj, and
v. Profits will also depend on a location-specific efficiency parameter, /4. Hence, in the absence
of government intervention, profits can be expressed as
7r(/4, P, w, r, v1, Vt).
State governments influence profits through a number of mechanisms. First, most states levy
corporate income taxes. Second, a number of states subsidize labor and/or the cost of plant
construction for any new investment. Third, the price of imported inputs will tend to be lower
in states with foreign trade zones (FTZs).5 We denote the corporate tax rate as t, the wage
subsidy rate as s, the capital subsidy rate as s,., and the implied imported input subsidy rate
caused by access to preferential tariffs as sf.
(1— t)7r(/L, P,w(1 —s),r(1—s),v,(1
—3f),Vt).
For estimation purposes we need to express the profitability of each state in an expression that
is linear in the parameters.
/4+ln(1tc)±p[nP+/wnw(1w)+/3rlnr(1—sr)+8flnVf(13f)+/3tlflv(.
This equation can be derived from profit maximization by a price-taking firm with a Cobb-
Douglas production function or it may be seen as a local first-order logarithmic approximation
of an arbitrary profit function. There is still some distance to be covered between the above
expression and a formulation that we can estimate. The reason is that while we have good
SSection IV exp1ain why this is the case.
6measures of the tax and subsidy variables, we cannot directly observe the input and output
prices relevant to foreign investors. And we have no direct information on the state-specific
efficiency parameter. Instead we rely on three groupings of observable state characteristics—
labor market conditions, proximity to markets, and agglomeration counts—which we believe to
be the primitive variables which determine w, r, vj, vj, P, and jL.
Labormarket conditions affect the prices of local inputs including labor itself, as well as any
locally supplied intermediate goods. Proximity to markets affects the delivered cost of foreign-
produced inputs (intermediates and capital goods) as well as the price net of transportation
costs received on final output. The specific variables we use to reflect proximity to markets and
labor market conditions are discussed in the following section.
The presence or absence of agglomeration economies will exert an additional influence on
the pattern of future investment. In the absence of .agglomeration, increasing investment in
a particular location ultimately leads to congestion; the clustering of investors in drives up
local factor prices and reduces the desirability of the locale as a site for future investment.
By way of contrast, if agglomeration economies are important, concentrated investment may
actually create significant positive spillovers which reduce a locale's factor prices and costs of
doing business. A site that held no particular attraction to investors in a certain industry could
become increasingly attractive due to the accumulation of investments in that industry.6
As discussed in Marshall (1920) and formalized in Henderson (1974) and Krugman (1991),
industry-level agglomeration effects can make a location more attractive via three mechanisms:
knowledge spillovers, diversity and scale of local specialized input supply, and labor-pooling.7 In
'Ranch (1993) and Krugman and Livas (1992) show that agglomeration eates the incentive for ongoing
growth &nd concentration, but that this concentration of production isboundedby the rise in price of fixed
factors such as land.
TSee Head, Ries and Swenson (1994) for a review of these theoretical motivations behind agglomeration
economies and their influence on investment. For the puxposes of this paper we are lees interested in the actual
sources of agglomeration than in the effects of agglomeration on the potency of itate investment promotion efforts.
7the context of the above notation, the first mechanism works through increases in ,thesecond
through reductions in ye, and the third through reductions in the costa of skilled workers, w.
Althoughthe clustering of firms in one location arises in most models due to technological or
pecuniary externalities, it may also arise through mechanisms which do not enhance produc-
tivity. DeCoster and Strange (1993) develop a model in which investors "imitate each other's
location decisions because they fear denial of future credit if they make eccentric choices that do
not work out." From the point of view of state governments this distinction may not matter, as
attracting the "pioneering" investor will still make it easier to attract subsequent investments.
In the data section which follows we discuss the way we operationalize each grouping of
variables. Since it is unlikely that the variables we use adequately capture all state characteristics
which influence profitability, we will use alternative-specific constants to control for unmeasured
state fixed effects. These may include climate, transportation networks, and any other stable
influences on the average Japanese investor.8 State fixed effect estimation will help avoid omitted
variable bias and provide a better fit of the model to the data. The measured variables, together
with the state-specific constants, constitute M in equation 1.
IV Data
We study a set of Japanese manufacturing establishments completed between 1980 and 1992
that are recorded by the Japan Economic Institute. For each investment we have information
on the year of completion, the identity of the parent firm, the industry in which the investment
occurred, and the number of workers employed. The location choices constitute our dependent
variable. The independent variables are the characteristics of 34 states which received more than
Sisce states actively altered promotion in thedecade,promotion data varies across time and we can empirically
distinguish their influence from state fixed effects.
8two investments in the 1980s. Most state attributes vary according to the timing or product
line of the investments. We now discuss each of the groups of variables introduced in the model
section.
Labor Market Conditions
No single variable can adequately capture interstate differences in wage C08t8.Theaverage
manufacturing wage is the obvious candidate but it ha.s several deficiencies. First, workers differ
in skills and in complementary factors. Hence we use average labor productivity, measured as
manufacturing value added per production worker to control for such differences. Unionization,
measured as the percent of manufacturing workers who are members of unions, could deter
investment by raising wages. After controlling for the wage, however, one would only expect
a negative effect if unions insist on restrictive work rules which further raise labor costs. Fi-
nally, a high unemployment rate could increase the attractiveness of a state to foreign investors
wishing to tap into a larger job applicant pool. Most location choice studies employ this set
of explanatory variables (see, for instance, the summary of previous work in Friedman et al
(1992)).
Pro ximit to Markets
Japanese-owned plants import substantial amounts of intermediate goods from the parent firm
and traditional suppliers based in Japan. In many cases, they also export goods back to the
Japanese market. Plant locations along the Pacific coast offer lower transport costs to and
from Japan. To capture effects of transportation costs on imported input and final good prices
we employ a Pacific Rim dummy variable which takes a value of one for California, Oregon,
Washington, and Alaska (Hawaii did not meet the criteria to be included in the choice set).
To represent proximity to U.S. demand we also include in-state income and bordering state
income in the regression. Bordering state income sums the income of all states surrounding the
9state that is under consideration. The rationale for including these variables is to estimate the
value of locating near to demand, since we would expect that proximity to final demand would
increase the final price net of transport costs received by the firm.
State Investment- Promotion Policies
States stepped up efforts to attract foreign investment in the 1980s. Many states opened in-
vestment offices in Japan as a means of disseminating information to potential investors and
encouraging them to choose that state when they located in the United States. As Table 1
shows, only 11 states had such offices in 1982. In the next eight years, eight more states opened
investment promotion offices in Japan. We employ a dummy variable indicating states with
these offices. It should be positively related to investment if investment offices succeeded in
biasing Japanese investors in favor of their state.
Over the same time interval, Table 1 also shows that 16 states who did not have foreign
trade zones added them. The presence of a foreign trade zone lowers the tariff costs of imported
intermediate goods via three mechanisms—payment delay, reexport, and reclassification. Pay-
ment delay is a benefit open to all users of foreign trade zones. Users of foreign trade zones do
not have to pay any tariff duties until goods are shipped from the foreign trade zones to final
market destinations in the United States. In addition, operation in a foreign trade zone enables
the firm to avoid all tariffs on imported intermediate goods that are reexported in final prod-
ucts. Finally, reclassification reduces costs when goods assembled within the zones are subject
to a lower tariff than are the component parts imported into the zone. Although the federal
government ultimately approves each zone, aLl applications are made with the support of state
and local governments. Hence, we consider the provision of FTZs as part of state promotional
efforts.
We employ an indicator variable to measure the influence of the existence of a least one FTZ

















Alabama X X X Missouri X X X
Alaska XMontana X X
Arizona X X Nebra.ska X X
Arkansas X X Nevada X
California X X New Hampshire X
Colorado X New Jersey X X
Connecticut X New Mexico X
Delaware X New York X X X X
Florida X XX X North CarolinaX X X
Georgia X XX X North Dakota X X
Hawaii X X Ohio X X X X
Illinois X X X Okiahonia X X
Indiana X X X Oregon X X
Iowa X X PennsylvaniaXXX X
Kansas X X Rhode Island X
Kentucky X X South CarolinaX X X X
Louisiana X X Tennessee X
Maine X Texas X X X
Maryland X X X Utah X X
Massachusetts X X Vermont X X
Michigan X X Virginia XX X X
Minnesota X X Washington' X X
Mississippi XWisconsin XX X
Nc,e: This table indicatesall states offering foreign trade zones. Subzone activities sic not included.
Idaho, South Dakota and West Virginia did not have general purpose zones. Zone 133, Quad-City
Iowa/illinois, is marked inbothstates.
11in a state. This variable takes a value of one for states with "general-purpose" zones as long
as the investor manu.factures a product which qualifies for automatic tariff treatment. General-
purpose FTZs are open to use by multiple businesses in contrast to "subzones" which encompass
single-user facilities. Products such as automobiles, auto parts, and televisions are considered
"sensitive" industries which must apply for subzone status in order to obtain tariff reductions.
This suggests that firms manufacturing such products would not be attracted by the presence
of a general-purpose zone. We confine our analysis to general-purpose zones because such zones
are accessible to new investors whereas subzones solely benefit existing plants.
We test the hypothesis that higher taxes deter investment by gathering data on the corporate
tax rate and unitary taxation. The latter is a method of taxing firms based on a proportion of
their worldwide profits rather than the accounting profits of the affiliate attributable to the state
of operation. Foreign firms actively opposed the tax because it exposes them to the possibility
of positive tax payments in states even if they earned no direct profits in that state of operation.
As an attempt to attract more investment, many states rescinded or modified their unitary taxes
during the 1980s. We add a variable measuring the corporate tax rate and a dummy variable
indicating the presence of a unitary tax law to explore the impact of taxation on investment.9
States also utilized labor and capital subsidies to attract investment. Calculation of the
subsidies required us to combine firm characteristics with specifics of the subsidy programs.
In those cases where the program specified a rate, the rate was used. In cases where states
provided a specified doUar inducement for each job created, we calculated a subsidy rate after
determining the relevant wage costs for the firm.'0 The capital subsidies used by states in our
'Classifying the status of unitary taxation in California was complicated by a legislative change. California
decided to allow firm, two options. Firm.s could either continue under the unitary form of taxation, or they could
elect to adopt a water's edge form of taxation. Making this election required a payment of 8500,000 and the
petition to adopt water's edge treatment could be rejected by the State of California. Since the cost of avoiding
unitary tax seems prohibitive, we decided to maintain California's designation as a unitary tax state after this
new law.
'°We employed 2-digit industry wage data to calculate the expected wage that each investor would have to
12sample were specified as a percentage of investment value.
Agglomeration variables
As discussed in the model section, agglomeration economies available in states may enhance
profits through a number of avenues. The availability of diverse and efficient input suppliers
may lead to lower input costs. Knowledge spillovers may directly improve plant efficiency, while
benefits associated with labor pooling may be partly passed on to firms.
In order to capture localization effects, we matched each Japanese investment to three ag-
glomeration variables: a count of U.S. establishments, a count of Japanese establishments, and
a count of keiretsu affiliates. The former two measures are matched to investments in the same
4-digit SIC industry. We add the count of keiretsu affiliates to capture potential externalities
that may exist between Japanese manufacturers and their supplier networks. Parallel to our
treatment of final demand, we also employ border-state sums for each of the three agglomeration
variables.'2
The selection of U.S. industry, Japan industry and Japan keiretsu measures of agglomera-
tion draws from earlier work (Head, Ries and Swenson (1994)). That paper found a remarkable
amount of stability in the agglomeration coefficients in estimations that varied the states in the
choice set and the investors in the "chooser" sample. It appears impossible to identify whether
the significance of the prior U.S. industrial pattern affects the Japanese because of agglomer-
ation externalities or because it reveals the abundance of factors which are used intensively in
particular industries. However, we believe the additional information contained in the Japanese
pay.Therate of labor subsidy was then computed as the lump-sum subsidy payment divided by the U.S. wage.
This method implicitly assumes that Japanese firms pay the iame amount for Labor as U.S. firms in the same
industry.
"Thus we consider only manufacturer-centered (vertical) keirei.sa and exclude bank-centered (horizontal)
kesret,,affiliations.
'2There is no reason to believe that the econowic boundaries across which agglomeration operates will coincide
with political boundaries. Our previous results 'how that both a.gglomeration within a state and in its bordering
states positively affect the probability of receiving investment.
13agglomeration variables strongly suggests the existence of localization externalities. In the policy
simulations we will operate under the maintained assumption that the follow-the-leader pattern
found in the data is a real phenomena but we will not speculate on its source.
V Estimation Results
The primary goal of our estimation is to assess the statistical significance of states' investment
promotion efforts. We will then use simulations to explore the economic significance of policy.
To obtain consistent estimates of the effects of promotion, we believe it is necessary to control
for industry-level agglomeration effects as well as state-level fixed effects. Nevertheless we begin
without these controls and estimate a baseline model that conforms with the specifications
that have been performed by other authors.13 The advantage of beginning with a specification
that is similar to other estimates in the literature is that we can first check that there are no
peculiarities in our sample of Japanese data that result in different estimated effects for regressors
that have been found previously. Moreover, having begun from a common framework, we can
determine the contribution that more precise agglomeration and promotion measures bring to
the estimates.
The benchmark results displayed in column (1) of Table 2 appear to mirror those found in
previous studies. As one would expect, states with lower wages or more productive worklorces
are more likely to attract investments than states who do not have these characteristics. The
somewhat surprising result here is that higher rates of union membership appear to attract
Japanese investors. This result has emerged in other investigations of investment decisions and,
as will be explained below, appears to be the result of omitted variable bias. Similar to previous
'o beginning specification is most similar to Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman (1992), but is based on
independeutvariables that aiecommon to many location c1oice models.
14Table 2: Conditional Logit Resultst
Dependent Variable: State Choice I
(1) (2) (3)
Labor Market Conditions
Log of Mfg. Wage 2.513**2.782**-0.19
(0.733) (0.750) (2.005)
Log of Mfg. Prod'y 0.663 1.746**-2.597
(0.590) (0.588) (2.495)
Unionization Rate 0.013* -0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.026)
Unemployment Rate 0.158** 0.159**0.2131*
(0.035) (0.037) (0.061)
Proximity to Markets
Pacific Rim Dummy 0.715*10.705*1
(0.151) (0.164)
Log of State Income 0.819*1 0.231* .3.653*
(0.082) (0.106) (1.493)
Log of Adjacent St. Income 0.3231*-0.01 2.701
(0.084) (0.090) (1.563)
State Policies
Japan Office Dummy -0.177 -0.005 -0.355
(0.097) (0.099) (0.200)
FTZ Dummy 1.0151*0.951* 0.863
(0.372) (0.374) (0.411)
Log of (1-Corp. Tax Rate)7.219*1 7•953**-14.457
(1.688) (1.696) (9.924)
Unitary Tax Dummy -0.097 .0.361* -0.107
(0.144) (0.159) (0.258)
Log (1-Labor Subsidy) .6.289*1..3•395* .11.673*1
(1.386) (1.488) (4.387)
Log (1-Capital Subsidy) 4.0841*2.65 -1.711
(1.279) (1.385) (4.344)
Agglomeration Effects OmittedIncludecLl Induded
Fixed Effects OmittedOmittedIncluded
Log- Likelihood -2446.059 -2187.172 -2084.796
t: Location choice model With751choosers and 34choices.Estimated by
maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. *anddenote
significance at the 5%and1% Levels.
: Agglomeration coefficients for columns (2)and(3)arereported in Table 3.
Coefficientsfor state-specific fixed effects are not reported.
15Table 3: Conditional Logit Results (cont'd)
Agglomeration Variables (2) (3)
Within-State Effects
Log of U.S. Industry Count0.503**0.483**
(0.058) (0.060)
Log of Japan Ind'y Count 0.859**0.585**
(0.091) (0.094)
Log of Keiretsu Count 0.951**0.753**
(0.130) (0.129)
Adjacent-State Effects
Log of U.S. Ind'y Count 0.283** 0.273**
(0.068) (0.072)
Log of Japan Ind'y Count 0.481**0.391**
(0.091) (0.094)
Log of Keiretsu Count 0.399**0.307*
(0.139) (0.141)
Log-Likelihood -2187.172 -2084.796
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Additional explanatory
notes in Table 2.
research on Japanese investment, we find that Pacific Rim states, those states with high levels
of income, and those states surrounded by other states with high levels of income were more
likely to receive investments.14 These findings suggest that transportation coats to final markets
play a large role in determining the sites selected by investors.
Increased investment promotion by states suggests that they believe that promotion tools will
successfully increase the investment they receive, or at a minimum, offset losses to competing
states which offer investment programs. Estimates of the coefficients on the policy variables
'4Most other studies (Friedman et al (1992), Woodward (1992)) measure the final demand in a location using
the distance-weighted sum of income in all states. Our approach, while conceptually mibir, explicitly estimates
the relative importance of demand originating in the state versus demand from other sts.te.
16indicate that investment incentives have met with varying levels of success. To begin, state
investment promotion offices in Japan have no apparent effect. This finding contrasts with
Woodward's (1992) result that state investment promotion offices opened in Japan are positively
correlated with investment. On the other hand, states who offered foreign trade zones within
their borders attracted more investments.15
The corporate tax rate, which entered the regression as log(1-corporate tax rate) has a posi-
tive coefficient, which indicates that higher state tax rates appear to deter Japanese investors.16
The unitary tax dummy variable enters with a negative, although insignificant, sign, suggest-
ing that the presence of the unitary method of taxation at most weakly deterred Japanese
investors. 17
Our estimates of capital and labor subsidy effects are mixed in the baseline regression.
In each case the subsidy is measured as log(l-subsidy rate), as this form follows from firms'
maximization problems. A negative coefficient on the subsidy variables implies that states
will garner increased investment if they increase their subsidies. While the baseline regression
suggests that labor subsidies bolster investment, the regression estimates imply the reversefor
the case of capital subsidies.
The second column of Table 2 displays coefficient estimates in a model that includes detailed
15The foreign trade zone variable that is displayed in Table 2 is set equal to I if a state had at least one general-
purposeforeigntrade zone, and the investor's industry of operation did not require application for aubzone
status. Alternate specifications were tested that directly entered the number of zones offered by each state or
that measured the number of foreign trade zones divided by state land area. However, these specifications did
not yield significant results. It appears that the ability to use a foreign trade zone is more important than the
pervasiveness of foreign trade zones throughout the state either in absolute number or density. We alsoestimated
the model assuming that all Japanese investors attach the same importance to FTZs, i.e. we did not restrict
auto and television manufacturers to have no attraction to FTZs; this had no appreciable impact on the indicator
variable's coefficient.
'6The functional form employed for the corporate tax follows from the way the tax rate enters the profit
function. However, we experimented with alternative specifications that used tax variables suggested by other
works, such as average tax per capita, and property tax collections. The results with these variables were mostly
insignificant and had negligible effects on the agglomeration and subsidy variables.
'TIn this specification as weU as those to follow, the estimate is not sensitive to whether or not we consider
California to continuously have a unitary tax.
17measures of agglomeration. We find that inclusion of agglomeration measures provides more
"sensible" estimates than the baseline specification. Productivity and unitary tax becomesig-
nificant and the estimated coefficient on unionization now has a negative (albeit insignificant)
sign. The latter ffnding suggests that, in contrast to the inference from the baseline specification,
unionization is not attractive to nvestors. Rather, states with a high level of agglomeration
are frequently more unionized, and investors select these states due to their agglomeration ben-
efits. While the perverse result on capital subsidies remains, the estimated coefficient is not
significantly different from zero. Another notable change is that the implied value of in-state
income and surrounding state income diminishes. The first set of results implied that demand
conditions provided a rationale for locating firms near demand. However, in-state andbordering-
state income are highly correlated with manufacturing activity, and appear to have pickedup
agglomeration effects in the baseline regression.
Table 3 reports coefficient estimates for the agglomeration variables. It reveals that counts
of U.S. investments, Japanese investments and investment by keiretsu affiliatespositively affect
investors' likelihood of selecting a state. The effects are strongest for in-state counts of these
variables, but bordering state counts also enter positively and significantly.
Our next specification adds state fixed effects. The third column of Table 2 indicates that
inclusion of state fixed effects aLso strongly affects the results. First, the coefficienton average
manufacturing wages remains negative, but the coefficient is now close to zero in magnitude
and it is no longer significant. Likewise, productivity and the unionization rateare insignificant.
The income variables that were interpreted earlier as indicators of demandno longer enter as
expected. Bordering income is insignificant while in-state income now enters the specification
with a negative sign. While we can only speculate about thecause of this perverse result, one
explanation might be that states that experienced income growth also had rising landprices.
18Our last variable that was used to proxy for a state's proximity to markets, the Pacific Rim
dummy, must be omitted in this regression since tuneinvariant state characteristics can not be
included in the presence of state fixed effects.
Tax effects become insignificant in the fixed effect regression. The new estimates find a weak
positive relationship between state corporate tax rates and levels of Japanese investment. The
coefficient on unitary taxation retains the expected sign but declines sharply in magnitude. The
absence of a strong deterrent effect of taxes on investment is not necessarily surprising, given
the dual layers of host and home taxation. The fact that Japanese investors face the worldwide
system of taxation at home, rather than the territorial system, will presumably make them less
sensitive to tax variations among states. When tax rates are higher at home than abroad, a
reduction in state taxes may simply result in an equal sized increase in Japanese taxes that
is due when after-tax profits are repatriated. In addition, if high taxes are correlated with
greater government services, while worldwide taxation blunts Japanese sensitivity to state tax
rates, then high taxes could even be associated with greater levels of investment. The limited
sensitivity of Japanese investment to taxes exhibited in our study is consistent with Hines'
(1993) empirical results that show that Japanese investment is less sensitive to interstate tax
variations than is foreign investment from territorial taxation countries.
The estimate of the coefficient for the Japan office dummy variable remains insignificantly
different from zero, indicating that states who used a Japan office to promote their state's posi-
tive features were no more successful in luring Japanese investments than were those states who
did not set up an investment promotion office in Japan. Our result suggest that Japanese in-
vestors were well-informed regarding each state's characteristics, and that their perceptions were
not swayed by promotional offices. The presence of FTZs continues to be significantly associated
with investment increases. Moreover, state incentive policies to influence firms' input costs now
19all enter as expected. Labor subsidies significantly increase the probability of receiving subsidies.
Capital subsidies are also associated with greater investment but the relationship is not statis-
tically significant. Finally, Table 3 shows that while the Japanese agglomeration coefficients are
somewhat diminished in the presence of fixed effects, they remain quite significant.
Overall, our results indicate that state promotional efforts which lower the input costs of
investors do provide a positive boost to investment. In particular, the provision of FTZs and
labor subsidies raises investment significantly in all three specifications. The strong agglomer-
ation we detect complements these state policies: Incentive programs that attract investment
will be accompanied by additional investment in the future due to increased agglomeration.
Finally, we find that the parameter estimates of variables specified in the baseline regression
are sensitive to inclusion of agglomeration variables and state fixed effects, suggesting that the
results of earlier empirical work on locational choice should be interpreted with caution.
VI Simulation Results
We turn to simulations to quantify the changes in the geographic distribution of the 751 Japanese
investments that would have occurred if particular state incentive programs had been removed.
The distribution of investment is first derived by calculating the probabilities that each invest-
rnent will locate in each state under different realizations of the policy variables using Equa-
tion (1). The simulation is dynamic in that these probabilities depend on where the simula-
tion predicts Japanese to locate in previous years. Thus, policies which raise current levels of
Japanese investment raise the probability of subsequent investment through increased Japanese
agglomeration. 18
Two policy variables had a significant and robust statistical influence on the location choice
ISThe aunuIaioos treat U.S. industry counts asexogenous.
20of Japanese investors—foreign trade zones and labor subsidies. We now consider in turn how
each of these policies affected the distribution of investment. We then explore the consequences
of wholesale elimination of promotional policies.
Table 4: The Proliferation of Foreign Trade Zones: Whiners and Losers
YearNumber of States Baseline (%)TotalElimination (%)Freezein 1980 (%)
Pre-1981 23 77.8 76.4 87.V
1981 2 5.2 5.5 2.7
1983 6 15.4 16.2 8.6
1984 3 1.6 1.9 1
Explanation: Investment shares generatedbydynamicsimulation.
Table4 groups states into four categories based on the year in which each state established
its first general-purpose FTZ and describes each group's share of investment under different
policy scenarios. AU states in our sample eventually adopted FTZs. As shown in the table, 23
states in our sample had FTZs in 1980, with the remaining 11 implementing them according
to the dates reported. The first column corresponds to the distribution of investment in a
simulation where all policy variables are given their historic values, which we refer to as the
baseline simulation.19 The second column shows the distribution of investment that would have
followed if all FTZs were eliminated in 1980. Comparing these shares to the baseline reveals
that the system of FTZs had very little effect on the pattern of investment. Since all states had
FTZs by 1984, at that time they were not a reason to prefer one state over another.
9We consider this approach to be superior to the alternative of using the actual distribution as the basis of
comparison. While our estimated coefficients replicatetheactual distribution of investment when weemploythe
historicvaluesfor all variables, it does not fit perfectly when the stock of Japanese agglomeration variables are
predictedbythe simulation. We do not want our policy effects confounded by deviation., attributabletothe lack
of exact fit of the model to the data.
21The third column measures the effect of a policy "freeze", where FTZ8 exist only for the 23
states that had them by 1980. The column reveals that these states' share of total investment
increases from 77.8% in the baseline to 87.7%. This gain, of course, comes at the expense of
the 11 states who do not introduce FTZs in this simulation. Their share of investment declines
by about one-half. This experiment reveals that while FTZs had little effect on the total
distribution, if states who did not offer FTZs in 1980 had not subsequently adopted them, they
would have received much less Japanese investment in the following decade. This illustrates the
prisoner's dilemma aspect of FTZ creation and is reinforced by results of additional simulations
displayed in Figure 1. This simulation shows the number of investments each state receives in
the baseline and how much each state would have received if it unilaterally eliminated FTZs
throughout the sample period. The figure indicates that each state would have lost about 50%
of its investment if it had not kept pace with competing states by providing foreign trade zones.
The next set of simulations considers labor subsidies. Unlike FTZs which eventually existed
in all states, only 10 states adopted labor subsidies for some period during our sample. Table 5
displays the effects of unilateral removal of subsidy programs by each of these states. The first
column lists the employment by Japanese plants in the baseline simulation where all states
offered their historic set of subsidies. The second column indicates the employment that would
have been lost had each state unilaterally removed its subsidy. The states are ordered according
to the ratio of employment changes over baseline employment. The table reveals that these
programs had strong effects on investment in certain states. Two-thirds of the employment
received by Indiana and Iowa, both of whom implemented jobs creation credits that paid up
to 10% of the first year wage bill in new plants, is attributable to the programs. For other
states the results are less dramatic because they offered small subsidies, often a small nominal







Figure 1: Consequences of Unilateral Removal of Foreign Trade Zone
: Thecombined stack shows the number of investments each state receives in the baseline simulation designed to
replicate historical policy. The solid bar reports the number of investments each state receives in the simulation
where it alone eliminates the FTZ.
The third column shows the additional employment attributable the the labour subsidies per
job paid for by the state, which we call the impact. The numerator of this statistic is column 2,
the employment increase attributable to the subsidy. The denominator multiplies the subsidy
rate by column 1, the estimated number of employees in the baseline simulation, to yield a
measure of the total number of employees in Japanese plants that were paid for through the
subsidy program. The impact statistic ranges from 7 to 12. Thus, on average, for every one
employee paid for entirely by a state, employment in Japanese plants increased by 10. While
states that offered lower subsidies received the greatest increase in Japanese employment per
job paid for by the state, these states generated relatively few jobs through these programs.
Finally, we consider the overall impact of promotional policies of states. While FTZ programs
largely offset each other in the simulations, states simultaneously pursued a number of other
23
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NTTable 5: The Impact of Unilateral Removal of Labor Subsidies on State Employment
State Baseline EmploymentEmployment LossesImpact8
Iowa 544 384 7
Indiana 8223 5800 8
California 26243 6279 10
Mississippi 442 83 7
New York 1878 189 9
Missouri 1221 67 12
Oklahoma 741 34 11
Kansas 345 14 11
Colorado 725 20 12
illinois 6636 119 10
: Employmeut attributable to subsidies per job subsidized, see expianation intext.
incentive programs. Did state efforts offset each other through their combined labor and capital
subsidies, foreign trade zones and taxes? To examine this question, Figure 2 compares the
number of Japanese plants predicted in baseline simulation to those predicted by a simulation
where no states offered FTZs, labor subsidies, capital subsidies, or unitary taxation. We refer
to the latter simulation as the cooperative scenario. The bars show the percentage change
in the number of plants from the baseline case to the cooperative case while the numbers
in parenthesis represent the difference in absolute numbers of plants. With the exception of
Indiana, the numbers do not appear to be large. Indiana loses a large number of plants under
cooperation primarily because they lose the benefits of their larger than average labor subsidy.
For the same reason Iowa loses under cooperation, but their losses are more moderate since they
only netted four investment in the baseline case. It appears that, with the exception of Indiana's
labor subsidy, incentive programs either offset one another or otherwise had little impact on the
distribution of Japanese investment.
24Figure 2: Quantifying the Individual Gains from Cooperation Between State Governments*
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25VII Conclusions
Agglomeration theory a.rgues that investment in related activities is self-reinforcing. Locations
which receive initial investment gain a subsequent advantage. The theory does not predict
where the initial investors will locate. The possibility that tax breaks and investment subsidies
might shift the starting point and enable future dynamic gains could motivate states to try
to influence the location decisions of new investors. Our results suggest that state jromotion
efforts significantly affected the location decisions of Japanese manufacturers. We ffnd that
states are more likely to attract investment if they have at least one general purpose foreign
trade zone in their boundaries and that state subsidies for labor also appear to sharply increase
the probability that a state will lure in new investments. Our simulations showed that if any
state had unilaterally eliminated its FTZs it would have lost approximately half its Japanese
investments. Unilateral removal of labor subsidies would have had a drastic effect on the few
states which offered substantial rewards tied to employment creation.
However, partly because of the proliferation of offsetting programs, the overall impact of
investment promotion by state governments appears fairly small. For example, by the middle
of the 1980's almost all states had at least one foreign trade zone, diminhing the advantage of
one state over the others. Given the history of the FTZs, we would expect that an expansion
of labor subsidy programs by other states would undercut the effectiveness ofany one state's
programs.
The picture which emerges from the simulations is that unilateral promotional effort can
yield a state large numbers of foreign manufacturing plants, but due to widespread emulation
by other states, the aggregate pattern of investment remains virtually unaltered. This suggests
the potential for states to reach a pareto-superior outcome if they could bind themselves not to
offer investment inducements. Recall, however, that our simulations predict the distribution of
26Japanese investment while holding the total amount of investment constant. State promotion
policies may have raised aggregate foreign direct investment in the U.S.. The examination of
this issue and the related welfare consequences are important topics for future research.
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Data Sources
Japanese manufacturing establishments are recorded in the Japan Economic Institute 1990 Up-
dated Survey. State income, the corporate tax rate, wages, union membership, and unemploy-
ment rates were collected from the 1982, 1986 and 1991 editions of the State and Metropolitan
Data Book. Each Japanese investment is matched to the data that corresponds most closely to
the year the plant began operations. Japanese ventures beginning between 1980 and 1983 were
connected to the 1982 data, ventures completed between 1984 and 1988 were attached to the
1986 data, and the remaining ventures were linked to the 1991 data. Data on the unitary tax
were collected from Tanneawald (1984) and from the Wall Street Journal and New York Times.
Manufacturing value added per production worker and manufacturing establishment counts in
the United States are calculated from the 1982 and 1987 Census of anufacturing. Investments
completed from 1980-1984 are matched to 1982 Census data while later investments are matched
to the 1987 Census data. Data on foreign trade zones is collected from the Foreign Trade Zones
Board at the U.S. Department of Commerce.
The Japan investment promotion office data and Labor and capital subsidy program informa-
tion were gathered from the Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development
in the United States, which is assembled by the National Association of State Development
Agencies (NASDA). NASDA published volumes in 1983, 1986 and 1991. The program data
were attached to the data set in the same fashion as the data from the State and Metropolitan
Data Book. The 2-digit industry wage data required to translate lump-sum labor subsidies to
rates were extracted from the Current Population Survey. We computed keiretsu counts based
on affiliations found in Kigyo Keiretsu Soran, a publication the Toyo Keizai company.
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